ARE U.S. BASED \u27JIHADI\u27 INSPIRED TERRORISTS TRANSITIONING AWAY FROM PHYSICAL TRAINING CAMPS TO ONLINE TRAINING CAMPS? by Clayton, Ashleigh Nicole
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations Office of Graduate Studies 
3-2018 
ARE U.S. BASED 'JIHADI' INSPIRED TERRORISTS TRANSITIONING 
AWAY FROM PHYSICAL TRAINING CAMPS TO ONLINE TRAINING 
CAMPS? 
Ashleigh Nicole Clayton 
claytona@coyote.csusb.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clayton, Ashleigh Nicole, "ARE U.S. BASED 'JIHADI' INSPIRED TERRORISTS TRANSITIONING AWAY FROM 
PHYSICAL TRAINING CAMPS TO ONLINE TRAINING CAMPS?" (2018). Electronic Theses, Projects, and 
Dissertations. 618. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/618 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Office of Graduate Studies at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses, Projects, and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
ARE U.S. BASED ‘JIHADI’ INSPIRED TERRORISTS TRANSITIONING AWAY 
FROM PHYSICAL TRAINING CAMPS TO ONLINE TRAINING CAMPS? 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Faculty of 
California State University, 
San Bernardino 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
in 
National Security Studies 
 
 
by 
Ashleigh Nicole Clayton 
March 2018 
  
ARE U.S. BASED ‘JIHADI’ INSPIRED TERRORISTS TRANSITIONING AWAY 
FROM PHYSICAL TRAINING CAMPS TO ONLINE TRAINING CAMPS? 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Faculty of 
California State University, 
San Bernardino 
 
 
by 
Ashleigh Nicole Clayton 
March 2018 
Approved by: 
 
Antony Field, PhD. Committee Chair, National Security Studies 
 
Steven Childs, PhD., Committee Member 
 
Thomas Long, PhD., Committee Member 
 
© 2018 Ashleigh Nicole Clayton  
 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of the backgrounds of twenty-five individuals 
who conducted a ‘jihad’ inspired terrorist attack within the United States between 
the years of 2001 and 2016 to determine if terrorists use physical training camps 
or online training camps as the main method of training to prepare for their 
attacks.   
The debate about the existence of online training camps is beneficial to 
the field of terrorism study. However, the question of what constitutes an online 
training camp must first be answered before it can be determined if terrorists are 
using online training camps. This thesis proposes a comprehensive definition for 
the term ‘online training camp;’ in an attempt to provide an analytical basis for the 
examination of U.S. based terrorist training to further the academic discussion.  
Additionally, it is suggested from the empirical examination of U.S.-based 
terrorist training backgrounds that terrorists appear to be engaging in 
supplemental self-directed online learning in combination with physical training, 
rather than a complete abandonment of physical training. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The United States, since 2001, has maintained what is referred to as a 
‘global war against terrorism,’ in response to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center in New York.1 Military campaigns that have worked to fight terrorism 
internationally have commonly targeted the locations where terrorists train. For 
example, Operation Infinite Reach, which was launched under President Bill 
Clinton in 1998 by the United States Navy, destroyed several Al Qaeda training 
camps in Afghanistan.2 Strikes against training camps have continued into recent 
years. In 2015 the US military conducted a raid against Al Qaeda camps in 
Kandahar, Afghanistan.3 Also, in addition to Al Qaeda, the United States has also 
undertaken strikes against ISIS. In October of 2017 the US military conducted an 
airstrike against an ISIS training camp in Yemen.4 Attacks against terrorist 
training camps have disrupted the operation of many camps. As a result some 
                                                 
1
 Lee Kuan Yew, “The United States, Iraq and the War on Terror,” Foreign Affairs January/February 2007 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2007-01-01/united-states-iraq-and-war-terror 
2
 Jamie McIntyre and Andrea Koppel,“U.S. missiles pound targets in Afghanistan, Sudan; Clinton: 
‘Our target was terror,” CNN, August 21, 1998. 
3
 Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “US Military Strikes Large Al Qaeda Training Camps in Southern 
Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, October 13, 2015. 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/us-military-strikes-large-al-qaeda-training-camps-in-
southern-afghanistan.php 
4
 Shawn Snow, “US Strike ISIS in Yemen again, killing 60 Terrorist Targets in Total,” Military Times, October 
26, 2017. https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/10/26/us-strikes-isis-in-yemen-again-killing-
60-terrorist-targets/ 
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scholars suggest that physical training camps are losing relevance and are 
becoming an outdated vehicle for terrorist training.5  
The internet, which has been a recognized mode of self-directed learning 
and instructor driven training for everyday civilians, presents a new medium for 
terrorist organizations to use for training their members. Increased use of the 
internet by terrorists since the 1990s,6 has raised the question of the internet 
functioning as an online training camp, potentially replacing the need for physical 
training for terrorists.7  
Statement of the Problem 
This thesis surveys the backgrounds of terrorist perpetrators within the 
United States from 2001 to 2016 to determine if terrorists are replacing 
attendance at physical training camps with the use of online training camps.  
Purpose of the Study 
The current argument that the internet is serving as an online training 
camp for U.S. terrorists, replacing the need to attend a physical training camp is 
of concern to the United States because it suggests that self-starter terrorist cells 
will be able plan, organize, train and carry out full-scale terrorist attacks using 
                                                 
5
 Aidan Kirby, “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case Study in indigenous 
Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 
(2007):415-428. 
6
 Gabriel Weinmann, Terror on the Internet: The New Area, The New Challenges, Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006. 
7
 Kirby, “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 
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only the information they locate online, opening up the possibility that terrorism 
might be increase in frequency.8  
Discussion of Concepts and Theories 
Physical training for the purpose of this discussion is defined as the 
continuous engagement in physical practice for the purposes of kinetic learning 
to be able to adaptably perform a task within a changing environment. Physical 
training requires the use of kinetic learning, which is the physical application of 
learned theory that has been taught through either formal or informal methods.9 
Physical training for terrorists can take place in a physical terrorist training camps 
which often has a similar structure to military training camps. Military camps 
consist of several different areas such as psychological conditioning, fitness, and 
technical skill instruction. A large part of physical training revolves around 
breaking down the individual and rebuilding them mentally in the ideology of the 
camp.10 For example, the army lists the following as the structure of their physical 
training camp: phase one is a reception week, phase two is the start of field 
exercises and teamwork, phase three is dedicated to marksmanship, rappelling, 
and confidence building, phase four focuses on weapons training and night 
infiltration, the final phase is completion of basic training, graduation and 
                                                 
8
 Kirby, “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”; David C Benson, “Why the Internet is Not 
Increasing Terrorism,” Security Studies, 23 (2014): 295. 
9
 Samuel Glass, “The Uses and Applications of Learning Technologies in the Modern Classroom: 
Finding a Common Ground Between Kinaesthetic and Theoretical Delivery,” ERIC, (March, 
2013): 1-13, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED477398.pdf 
10
 Joining the Ranks: The Role of Indoctrination in Transforming Civilians to Service Members. 
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progression to advanced individual training.11 Physical training camps in general 
appear to have a technical hands-on focus provided by qualified instructors and 
can have an additional focus on changing the psychological mindset of the 
participant to have lasting effects on the individual after they leave the camp. A 
physical training camp for the purpose of this discussion is defined as the 
structured face-to-face delivery of educational materials by an instructor for the 
purposes of engaging in kinetic learning through the practice of physically 
attending classes, meetings, demonstrations or practice sessions synchronously 
with the instructor and other program members that allows for interaction 
between the instructor and participants and encourages demonstration of the 
physical training skill currently being acquired by participants for 
evaluation/critique by the instructor. 
The purpose of physically training a skill is to know how to perform that 
skill in a myriad of circumstances; this idea is encapsulated in the theory of 
perceptual learning. Perceptual learning theory is, “…experience-induced 
improvements in the pick-up of information.”12 Individuals perceive the world 
around them and it is through these perceptions that they determine their actions. 
The human brain attempts to estimate how an object will interact with the 
environment around it as the object is known to remain consistent within its 
                                                 
11
 “Basic Combat Training,” Go Army, last updated May 13, 2015. 
https://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/becoming-a-soldier/basic-combat-training.html 
12
 Patrick Garrigan and Philip J. Kellman, “Perceptual Learning Depends on Perceptual 
Constancy,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105, no. 6 (2008): 2248. 
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environment.13 Perceptual learning theory applied to motor skills states that new 
skills are acquired through environmental demand and adapt over time to be 
executed effortlessly.14 Essentially, the human brain perceives the world around 
it and then must practice the learned motor skill repeatedly to perfect the action 
as the environment changes around the individual. It is through this practice and 
adaptation that individuals can learn to adapt to different situations and transfer 
the motor skills they learned into these new situations.15 
Perceptual learning theory is built upon the foundation of muscle memory 
which is obtained through practice. The term practice is defined as, “…a highly 
structured domain-specific activity that improves performance, generates no 
financial or commendation rewards, is costly due to resource access, and is 
arduous to perform.”16 For example, college athletes have reported practicing up 
to forty hours a week, amounting to the hours for a standard full time job in the 
United States.17 Researchers determined that on average, for most subjects such 
as sports, music or chess, it took approximately 10,000 hours or 10 years of 
practice to reach what would be considered expert level.18 
An online training camp for the purpose of this discussion is defined as the 
structured delivery of digital learning content and instructor interaction through 
                                                 
13
 bid, 2248. 
14
 Simon M. Rosalie and Sean Muller, “A Model for the Transfer of Perceptual-Motor Skill 
Learning in Human Behaviors,” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 83, no. 3 (2012): 413. 
15
 Ibid, 415. 
16
 Ibid, 415 
17
 Peter Jacobs, “Here’s the Insane Amount of Time Student-Athletes Spend on Practice,” Business Insider 
January 27, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/college-student-athletes-spend-40-hours-a-week-
practicing-2015-1 
18
 Ibid, 415 
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the practice of distance education or E-learning by an instructor or instructors 
outside of the a formal learning environment where there would be physical 
interaction with the instructor to multiple users either at the same time or different 
times that encourages participants to reach deep processing levels. Online 
training for the purpose of this discussion is defined as the consumption of digital 
learning content through the practice of distance education by a single individual 
or group of individuals outside of a formal learning environment where there 
would be physical interaction with the instructor. Online training is different from 
the concept of self-directed learning because there is still a feedback system 
between the instructor and the student within online training. Self-Direct learning 
is the concept of directing one’s self in personally prescribed learning exercises 
that requires the need of self-management and self-monitoring to achieve one’s 
learning goals.19 The difference between self-directed learning and online training 
through  a medium such as distance education has been differentiated by the 
United States Department of Education through the office of Federal Student Aid 
which defines ‘distance education as:  
Education that uses certain technologies to deliver instruction to students 
who are separated from the instructor and to support regular and substantive 
interaction between students and the instructor. The Interaction may be 
synchronous (student and instructor are in communication at the same time) or 
asynchronous. The technologies may include the Internet; audio conferencing; or 
one-way and two-way transmission through open broadcast, closed circuit, cable 
microwave, broadband lines, fiber optics, satellite, or wireless communications 
devices. A course taught through video cassettes or discs is also considered a 
                                                 
19
 Mardziah Hayati Abdullah, “Self-Directed Learning,” ERIC Digest, (December, 2001), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED459458.pdf 
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distance education course but only if one of the three technologies listed is used 
to support interaction between the students and the instructor.20 
 
Distance education requires the use of Digital Learning Content which is 
defined by the United States Government as “Learning materials and resources 
that can be displayed on a digital device and shared electronically with other 
users. Digital learning content includes both open and or commercial content.”21 
The purpose of all distance education and online training is to achieve deep 
processing understanding about a subject. The concepts of surface and deep 
processing can be understood from the following chart recreated from Offir et. al 
that summarizes the differences. 
 
Table 1. Surface and Deep Processing Characteristics Reproduced from Offir et.    
     al.22 
Surface Processing Deep Processing 
Repeating the statement of a problem 
without quotes or interpretation. 
Connecting facts, ideas and 
concepts in order to interpret, 
propose or judge.  
Repeating what was said without 
adding new elements. 
Proposing new elements of 
information. 
Using ideas of concepts that were 
presented, without adding personal 
comments or advancing the idea. 
Creating new information from 
information that was collected, 
using hypotheses and quotes.  
Proposing solutions without 
explanations. 
Proposing one or more solutions in 
terms of judgement. 
Judging without justifying. Assuming advantages and 
disadvantages for a situation or 
                                                 
20
 “Distance Education,” in FSA Handbook 2016-2017, Office of Federal Student Aid (June 
2016):2-30.  
** “Digital Learning Content,” United Stated Department of Education, accessed January 12, 
2018, https://www.ed.gov/race-top/district-competition/definitions. 
22
 Baruch Offir, et al., “Surface and deep learning processes in distance education: Synchronous 
versus asynchronous systems,” Computers and Education, 51 (2008): 1172-1183. 
8 
 
solution 
Asking questions about information that 
is irrelevant to the problem or that do 
not contribute to its understanding. 
Presenting proof for support by 
examples. 
Proposing several solutions and 
refraining from indicating the most 
suitable solution.  
Judgment supported by 
justifications. 
 Handling a problem in a wider 
perspective. 
 Developing new strategies with a 
wider framework. 
 
A simplistic definition of surface learning is, “the intention to reproduce 
information in compliance with externally imposed task demands.”23 Deep 
learning can be simplified to, “…an intention to understand…”24  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
23
 Noel Entwistle and Susan Waterston, “Approaches to Studying and Levels of Processing in 
University Students,” British Journal of Educational Psychology 58, no. 3 (1988):258-259.  
24
 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Some scholars argue that online training camps are replacing physical 
training camps for United States-based jihadist inspired terrorists. Kirby proposes 
that the information found online was once only available through physical 
training camps, and now that it is online physical camps are not necessary.25 She 
offers Al Qaeda’s publication, Mu’asker al Battar, as evidence that there are 
online training camps in current operation, highlighting the idea that the London 
7/7 bombers could have used the al Battar magazine for their attack and did not 
need in outside training.26 Kirby also draws upon the evidence of a dry run 
performed by the bombers before the attack, and that the type of explosive 
employed are all features of the al Battar instructional publication to illustrate her 
point.  
A study conducted by Gabriel Weinmann during the late 1990s consisted 
of monitoring terrorist information online. Weinmann focused on the internet 
being used as an online training camp, and suggests that an online training camp 
constitutes, “…using the computer-mediated channels to train, teach, direct and 
co-ordinate terrorists.”27 This proposes that online training camps encompass 
oversight in the planning of and preparation for attacks. He also states later on 
that, “For al Qaeda, the Internet serves as a virtual training camp…The Internet 
                                                 
25
 Kirby, “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 
26
 Ibid, 425 
27
 Weinmann, Terror on the Internet: The New Area, The New Challenges, 6 
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has become a valuable tool for the terrorist organization, not just to coordinate 
operations and launch attacks, but also as a virtual training camps, a tool of 
indoctrination and recruitment.”28   
The argument against the internet as an online training camp focuses on 
the internet as an information repository or ‘digital library.’29 Stenerson states 
online training camps need to include vetted quality material from known terrorist 
organizations, specifically with the intent to train members. There should also be 
an aspect of interaction with a qualified instructor, not just an unidentified online 
sympathizer.30 Currently, Stenerson feels that these qualifications are not being 
met by terrorist organizations and, therefore, no online training camp currently 
exists.31  
 Petter Nesser also stated that it is, “…misleading, or at least premature, 
to refer to the Internet as a ‘virtual training camp,” and that while there were 
terrorist cells that downloaded instructional materials while planning attacks, he 
found no instances where cells could be considered ‘virtual only.’32  Finally, 
Ramsey believes that even though terrorists are using the Internet, which does 
not mean they are gaining the upper hand from their use.33 Terrorists are noted 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, 14 
29
 Anne Stenerson, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 20 
(2008) 
30
 Ibid 
31
 Ibid 
32
 Petter Nesser, “How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 20 (2008):235. 
33
 Gilbert Ramsay, “’Terrorist’ Use of the Internet: An Overblown Issue.”  Middle East- Topic & 
Arguments, 6 (2016):89 
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to be wary of the internet because they recognize that outside groups are 
monitoring them for evidence of terrorist activities.34  
The current debate on the use of online training camps for U.S.-based 
jihadi inspired terrorists finds itself mired in several intellectual bogs. First, there 
is a large debate about the existence of online training camps and little about 
what constitutes an online training camp. Wiennman makes note of an internet 
bomb making course established by Hamas' military wing on their website.35 The 
course is stated to be interactive in nature, allowing for participants to 
communicate directly with the instructor. However, Weinnman does not define 
this an online training camp, but rather an internet course. Nevertheless, his 
following paragraph states that al Qaeda uses the internet as an online training 
camp, citing Al Battar as al Qaeda’s online training camp.36 Weinmann fails to 
point out that the publication initially featured a small interactive component 
where readers were able to communicate with qualified instructors through 
email.37 This does increase the legitimacy of the publication as an example of a 
training camp, but it is not an ongoing publication transitioning it into a static 
document, leaving room to question whether an online training camp must be 
restricted to interactive content, or if it can encompass the reading of documents 
from a database of training documents? 
                                                 
34
 Ibid,91 
35
 Weinmann, Terror on the Internet: The New Area, The New Challenges, 14-15 
36
 Ibid  
37
 Stenerson, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” Terrorism and Political Violence,226 
12 
 
 Kirby also draws attention to “sophisticated virtual training camps”38 as an 
alternative to attending a traditional training camp, fails to offer a definition: “The 
exchange of this type of instruction [bomb making and attack tradecraft] through 
monthly magazines, chat forums, and sophisticated virtual camps has given rise 
to the ‘do-it-yourself’ age of jihadist terror much the way the Internet has 
facilitated online education, business, and countless other hobbies and 
pursuits.”39 Kirby lists ways to learn, including online training camps, but does not 
define online training camps. 
Stenerson throughout her article provides properties which she attributes 
to an online training camp: verified and qualified instructors, production of quality 
materials specifically distributed by an official terrorist organization for the 
purposes of training mamebers, and an interactive component.40 However, 
Stenerson never build a comprehensive definition.  
Stenerson then concluded that, “In order to talk about the Internet as a 
“virtual training camp,” we have to establish whether al Qaeda is, in fact, making 
an organized effort to train their followers online. A review of the jihadi training 
manuals and interactive forums that exist on the Internet today shows that this is 
not the case.”41 She also suggests the Al Battar publication as the best example 
of an attempt by al Qaeda to train its members online, given that it once had an 
                                                 
38
 Kirby,“The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”:425. 
39
 Ibid 
40
 Stenerson, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 230 
41
 Ibid 
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interactive component. The weakness in Stenerson’s theory lies in the section 
focused on interactivity, 
It seems clear that in order to call the Internet a “virtual training camp,” it 
has to represent more than just a place for storing and distributing training 
material. As this study is only concerned with publically available websites, the 
answer to this question will be only partial. There are a lot of other channels in 
which training and exchange of information may take place, such as chatrooms, 
PalTalk and private e-mail, in addition to forums with more restricted membership 
that requires personal references or other screening processes.42 
It appears that Stenerson’s conclusion that al-Qaeda is not making an 
organized effort to train their members online seems a premature diagnosis, 
since she notes that she does not have access to all possible hosting platforms. 
What the debate does highlight is the lack of a comprehensive definition for what 
constitutes an online training camp, and a need to determine how U.S.-based 
terrorists are actually training. 
 
  
                                                 
42
 Ibid, 228 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the background of twenty-four perpetrators who 
conducted ‘jihadi’ inspired terrorist attacks within the United States between the 
years of post- 9/11 2001 and 2016. The study is restricted to the United States to 
determine if there is a reliable pattern of indicators that can be established, which 
could be applied to further research in other countries. The date range of post-
9/11 2001-2016 was selected because cases newer than 2016 are unreliable in 
indicators as they are often still being investigated and not all material about the 
perpetrators has been released. Additionally, as a large component of this study 
involves the internet and social media, this study does not look at cases older 
than pre-9/11 2001. Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were 
not invented until the mid-2000s.43 44 Also, computers were only present in 8.2% 
of all American households in 1984.45 In 1997, only 18% of American households 
had internet access.46 It was not until the year 2001 that 56.3% of households 
owned a computer and 50.4% of households had internet access.47 Furthermore, 
                                                 
43
 Carolyn Abrams, “Our First 100 Million,” Facebook, August 26, 2008, 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/our-first-100-million/28111272130/ 
44
 Twitter Inc, “Twitter Turns Six,” Twitter, March 21, 2012, 
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2012/twitter-turns-six.html. 
45
 “Households with Computers and Year of Purchase, by Presence of Children, Family Income 
and Age of Householder: October 1984,” United States Census Bureau, accessed January 12, 
2018, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/computer-internet/1984/p23-
155/tab01.pdf 
46
 Households With a Computer and Internet Use: 1984 to 2009,” United States Census Bureau, 
accessed January 12, 2018, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/computer-
internet/computer-use-1984-2009.html 
47
 Ibid 
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the sample excludes cases where the perpetrators that the START database 
attributed to Jihadi inspired terrorism but actually was not.  
All cases were compiled from the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) global terrorism database. Using 
the advanced search options, a database search was performed using the 
following parameters: United States, post 9/11 2001-2016. From the search list 
cases were recorded that listed the perpetrator group as either Jihad-inspired 
extremists, Muslim extremists or a known terrorist organization such as ISIS or 
al-Qaeda. This search yielded a total of thirty unique perpetrators. After compiling 
a list of perpetrators, open source media was searched through the LexisNexis 
Academic database for information on each of the perpetrators. The following six 
perpetrators were excluded from the analysis: Preston Lit, Justin Najan Sullivan, 
and Rasheed Abdul Aziz. 
Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber who attempted to detonate a 
bomb on American Airlines Flight 63 from Charles-de-Gaul airport to Miami, is 
listed in the START database as an attack in France. It has been included in this 
case selection because the flight falls under Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the 
United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 32(a) for the offense of attempted 
destruction of the aircraft. The Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States is 
relevant to all United States registered flights and those international flights that 
16 
 
have a destination within the United States and are considered “in flight”48 on 
which a crime is being committed.49  
Preston Lit admitted to planting fake bombs around the city of 
Philadelphia, however, he was determined to be mentally unstable and was off of 
his prescribed medications when the incidents occurred. Lit had a previous 
history of delusional behavior.50 Lit attached messages about ‘freeing Palestine’ 
to his fake incendiary devices which cause authorities to first approach the case 
as possible terrorism.51 He was not charged with terrorism but rather arson and 
the threat to use a weapon of mass destruction.52 It does not appear the Lit’s 
actions were one of a jihad inspired terrorist, so he has been excluded from the 
research. 
Justin Najan Sullivan shot and killed John Bailey Clark Jr. in a robbery. He 
wanted the money to carry out an ISIS inspired attack;53 this does not constitute 
                                                 
48
 “An aircraft is ‘in flight’ from the moment when all external doors are closed and following 
embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened for disembarkation, or in the case 
of a forced landing, until competent authorities take responsibility for the aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. 
45501(1)  
49
 Office of the United States Attorneys. 1405. Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States. 
Criminal Resource Manual https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1405-special-
aircraft-jurisdiction-us 
50
 Liz Spikol, “Lit Fuse: Preston Lit was an average guy—union electrician, homeowner, loving 
son and brother. So how did he become the mentally ill fugitive no one can help?” Philadelphia 
Weekly, last modified March 17, 2004, http://www.philadelphiaweekly.com/news/lit-
fuse/article_e5f289c0-4310-5196-9a9c-589838a72108.html 
51
 Jeanne Meserve and John King, “Mental Evaluation Ordered for Philly Bomb Suspect,” CNN, May 16, 
2002. http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/16/philadelphia.bomb/index.html 
52
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killed up to 1,000 people,"MailOnline, July 17, 2017. 
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a terrorist attack attempt. The purpose of the murder was funding to commit acts 
of terror, but the murder itself was not a jihadi-inspired terrorist attack. 
Rasheed Abdul Aziz went to the Corinth Missionary Baptist Church with 
the intent to kill the patrons of the church, but he was talked down by the pastor 
John Johnson.54 Aziz left the church without attacking anyone, and was 
subsequently arrested for illegal possession of a weapon as he had a prior 
record that prevented him from owning a weapon.55 He was not arrested on 
charges of terrorism as he did not follow through with the attack, excluding this 
incident as a jihadi-inspired terrorist attack or attempt. 
The rest of the cases were analyzed for evidence of online training or 
physical ‘face-to-face’ training.  
 
Table 2. Summarization of Perpetrators 
Date Perpetrator Details 
11/26/2016 Abdul Razak Ali Artan 
Attack on the Ohio State 
campus in Columbus, Ohio by 
driving a car into a crowd; after 
which Artan proceeded to exit 
the vehicle and attempt to stab 
bystanders with a knife.56 
9/1/2016 Ahmad Khan Rahami 
Series of bombings that 
occurred between the dates of 
September 17th and 19th, 2016 
                                                 
54
 Emily Guevara, “Pastor calms man during church threat,” Tyler Paper, September 15, 2015, 
https://tylerpaper.com/news/local/pastor-calms-man-during-church-threat/article_925f934b-ac87-
5811-8172-47dfbdddae99.html. 
55
 "UPDATED: Suspect in church threat says instructed by God to 'slay infidels'," Jacksonville 
Daily Progress (Texas), September 14, 2015. 
56
 Alex Wellman, “FBI reveal Ohio State University attacker “may have been inspired by ISIS” to 
commit car and machete rampage; Abdul Razak Ali Artan slammed his car into a group of people 
before leaping out and hacking at innocent passer-by with a butcher’s knife,” Trinity Mirror, 
November 30,2016. 
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in New Jersey and New York. 
6/12/2016 Omar Mateen 
An attack on the Pulse 
Nightclub in Orlando, Florida 
and opened fire on the crowd. 
1/7/2016 Edward Archer 
Archer fired thirteen shots at a 
police officer after flagging 
down the patrol car, hitting the 
officer three times. 
12/2/2015 
Tashfeen Malik 
Syed Rizwan Farook 
Attack on the Inland Regional 
Center social services agency 
in San Bernardino, California 
and opened fire on his own co-
workers at an office Christmas 
Party.  
11/4/2015 Faisal Mohammad 
An attack on a group on 
students on the University of 
California- Merced campus, 
stabbing four individuals before 
being interrupted by a 
construction worker and fleeing 
the scene.57  
7/16/2015 
Mohammad Youssuf 
Abdulazeez 
Attack on two separate military 
recruitment centers in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. 
Abdulazeez first fired at the 
Lee Highway recruiting center 
and then with the police 
chasing him he drove to the 
Amnicola Highway recruitment 
center crashing through the 
security gate in front of the 
facility and then proceeded to 
fire into the buildings.5859 
5/3/2015 
Elton Simpson  
Nadir Soofi 
Attack on the Curtis Culwel 
Center in Garland, Texas 
                                                 
57
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58
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about the Chattanooga gunman; The Gunman, 24, who died in an attack on a military recruitment 
center after allegedly killing four US marines, is believed to have been born in Kuwait,” Guardian, 
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during a ‘draw prophet 
Muhammad contest’. Simpson 
and Soofi opened fire outside 
the Center at the end of the 
contest, initially targeting a 
police car that was in front of 
the center before being killed. 
04/27/2014 
06/01/2014 
06/25/2014 Ali Muhammad Brown 
Brown murdered three 
individuals across two states. 
He killed Brendan Tevlin in 
West Orange, New Jersey by 
shooting him at a traffic light. 
He also shot Leroy Henderson, 
Ahmed Said and Dwone 
Anderson-Young in Skyway 
and Seattle, Washington. 
10/23/2014 Zale Thompson 
Thompson attacked several 
police officers standing on the 
street in New York City with a 
hatchet.60 
4/1/2013 
Tamerlan Tsavnaev 
Dzhorkhov Tsavnaev 
The Tsavnaev brothers 
detonated multiple homemade 
bombs around the finish line of 
the Boston Marathon.61  
11/30/2012 Abdulatif Ali Aldosary 
Aldosary detonated a 
homemade explosive device 
outside of the Social Security 
Office in Casa Grande, 
Arizona. Aldosary is also said 
to be responsible for the 
shooting of a man on 
November 27, 2012.62 
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10/2010 Yonathan Melaku 
Melaku fired upon several 
military facilities and the 
Pentagon.63  
05/01/2010 Faisal Shahzad 
Shahzad attempted to 
detonate a car bomb in Times 
Square, New York. He lit the 
bomb but it did not explode; 
only creating smoke and 
attracting the attention of 
passersby who alerted the 
police. Causing any further 
attempt to detonate the bomb 
to be interrupted.  
12/25/2009 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
Abdulmutallab boarded a 
Northwest Airlines flight from 
Amsterdam to Detroit, shortly 
before landing in Detroit 
Abdulmutallab attempted to 
detonate an explosive device 
that was sewn into his 
underwear.64  
11/5/2009 Nidal Malik Hasan 
Hasan, an army psychiatrist 
opened fired on the Fort Hood 
army base in Texas.65  
6/1/2009 Abdulhakim Muhammad 
Muhammad opened fire on an 
Army-Navy recruiting center in 
Little Rock, Arkansas.66  
3/8/2006 Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar 
Taheri-azar rented a Jeep and 
drove it through a crowd on the 
University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill campus.   
1/5/2002 Charles Bishop 
Bishop stole a plane from a 
local airfield where he was 
taking flying lessons and 
crashed it into a Bank of 
America building in Tampa, 
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 Warren Richey, “Underwear Bomber trial: Will is shed light on American cleric killed in Yemen? 
The trial of the accused underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab is set to being Tuesday. 
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65
 “A look at attacks on military bases in the US,” Associated Press, July 16, 2015. 
66
Ibid. 
21 
 
Florida.  
3/31/2003 Eid Elwirelwir 
Elwirelwir crashed his car 
through the security gate at 
March Airforce Base in 
Riverside, California.  
12/22/2001 Richard Reid 
Reid boarded an American 
Airlines flight in Paris that was 
destined for Miami. His shoes 
contained an explosive device, 
while attempting to detonate 
the device he was 
apprehended by fellow 
passengers. 
 
Each case was then examined using the following list of indicators to 
determine the main source of training for each perpetrator. A strong indicator of 
online training is private internet communication with known terrorists. Weak 
indicators of online training include download of manuals, watching videos of 
attacks, and visiting extremist websites. Strong indicators of physical ‘face-to-
face’ training are proof of training in an established terrorist training camp and 
military enlistment. A weak indicator of physical ‘face-to-face’ training is known 
organized group practice (firearms or other). A very weak indicator is overseas 
travel to locations with known operational terrorist training camps. This last 
indicator is included because overseas travel to areas with known terrorist 
training camps often brings in the speculation by officials that it is possible for the 
suspect to have traveled to the camp to receive training but that there is no 
physical proof of them actually attending the camp.   
Private internet communication with known terrorists is a strong indicator 
though it is not always disclosed what the private conversations were about. 
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However, it is one of the most direct ways to receive terrorist training instruction 
over the internet. Weak indicators for online training are still useful, because they 
show the attempt to gain training online. The downloading of training manuals is 
considered a weak indicator of online training because as specially-designed 
learning materials, they provide detailed instruction for users. However, not every 
individual will be able to understand the directions though they are often geared 
towards those without formal training. For example, the al-Qaeda magazine 
Inspire is known for including explosives recipes that focus on building bombs 
from household items,67 making it possible for those without true explosive 
training to attempt to create explosive devices. Watching attacks online may help 
individuals carry out an attack by demonstrating what the perpetrator should do 
or not do to carry out a successful attack. Visiting extremist websites can provide 
individuals with access to other training materials that were not reported in the 
open source media.  
Proof of training in an established terrorist training camp is the strongest 
indicator of physical ‘face-to-face’ training. Proof is either a photograph or video 
of the suspect inside a known terrorist camp, a statement by the suspect that 
they attended a training camp. The other strong indicator for physical training is 
military enlistment. Military enlistment is considered a physical training indicator 
because all new service members are subjected to basic training that provides 
                                                 
67
 Claire Wiskind, “Lone Wolf Terrorism and Open Source Jihad: An Explanation and 
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them with some rudimentary physical and firearms training. 68 The military 
enlistment indicator category also includes individuals who fought with unofficial 
military forces in other countries. Organized group practice is considered a weak 
indicator because, although a necessary step to weapons mastery, the lack of an 
instructor makes it self-directed learning. Practice for the context of this thesis 
mostly involves organized visits to firing ranges with friends or relatives. The last 
weak indicator for physical training is overseas travel.69 Many details of these 
trips are not fully released to the media, leading to speculation about whether the 
individual attended a terrorist training camp, or came into contact with other 
individuals that trained them face-to-face in some manner but there is no actual 
concrete proof that the traveler attended a physical training camp. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 Military service also includes occasions of practice and further development, as continuing 
maintenance of skills is typically required. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS 
The following is an analysis of the indicators for physical or online training 
expressed by each individual perpetrator as divulged by open source media.70   
Indicators by Perpetrator Explanations 
 
Table 3. Perpetrator and Indicator Explanations 
Perpetrator Adbul Razak Ali Artan 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Abdul Razak Ali asylum with his family in Pakistan after 
fleeing Somalia due to “Militia and Al-Shabbah” 
persecution.71 It is noted in Artan’s case that this 
indicator is particularly weak because he did not travel 
outside the U.S. after arrival, but  spent possibly seven 
years in Pakistan during his teenage years.72 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Ahmad Khan Rahami 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Rahami exhibited the indicators for overseas travel and 
training in an established training camp. Investigators 
have stated they believe the explosive devices he 
constructed indicate Rahami had training beyond 
reading online manuals.73 Rahami traveled to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan during the years of 2011 and 
2014.74  
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Online Training 
Indicators 
His father reported to the FBI that Rahami watched 
explosions online and visited websites belonging to al 
Qaeda and the Taliban.75 
Perpetrator Omar Mateen 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Mateen exhibited the indicator for overseas travel. He 
traveled to Saudi Arabia in 2011 and 2012.76  
Online Training 
Indicators 
Mateen exhibited the indicators for watching attacks 
online and visiting extremist sites. His wife has stated 
that he watched jihadist videos and it was disclosed by 
the FBI that Mateen’s computer was used to visit 
extremist websites.7778 
Perpetrator Edward Archer 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Archer, exhibited the indicator of overseas travel. Archer 
traveled to Saudi Arabia and Egypt during the years 
2011 and 2012.79 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Syed Rizwan Farook 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Farook exhibited the physical indicators of overseas 
travel and group practice. He traveled to Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan multiple times between the years 2011 and 
2014.80 Farook was also known for visiting firing ranges 
as a hobby, alone and with his wife.81 
Online Training 
Indicators 
Farook exhibited the indicators for manual download, 
visiting extremist websites and private messages with 
known terror organizations. He downloaded Al Qaeda 
Inspire, to follow the bomb making instructions.82 Farook 
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is known to have communicated online with Nusra Front 
and al-Shabab members on social media.83 He also 
spent time visiting extremist websites.84 
Perpetrator Tashfeen Malik 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Malik exhibited the indicators as well for group practice. 
Since she lived overseas for most of her life, her time 
spent there is not analyzed as part of this study. Malik is 
known to have attended practice at gun ranges with her 
husband.85  
Online Training 
Indicators 
Malik exhibited the indicators for visiting extremist sites. 
She viewed extremist material online along with her 
husband.86 
Perpetrator Faisal Mohammad 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Online Training 
Indicators 
Mohammad exhibited the indicator for visiting extremist 
sites. The FBI released that Mohammad’s computer 
browser history was full of visits to extremist sites.87 
Perpetrator Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Abdulazeez exhibited the indicators for overseas travel 
and group practice. He visited Jordan in 2014.88 He also 
practiced shooting regularly since his childhood, starting 
with BB guns and Paintball guns before moving on to 
assault rifles after returning from Jordan. 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Elton Simpson 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Simpson both has indicators for group practice as he 
were shown by a friend, Abdul Kareem, how to fire the 
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weapons that were to be used in the attack and 
practiced firing with them.89 
Online Training 
Indicators 
Simpson exhibited the indicators for watching attacks 
online and private messages with known terror 
organizations. He was using the encrypted application 
Surespot to talk to Mohammed Miski, an ISIS recruiter, 
who messaged Simpson to carry out the attack.90 He 
also watched online jihadist videos.91  
Perpetrator Nadir Soofi 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Soofi exhibited the indicators for group practice, he was 
shown how to fire the weapons used in the attack by a 
friend, Abdul Kareem, and together with Elton Simpson 
the group practiced shooting together.  
Online Training 
Indicators 
Soofi exhibited the indicator for watching attacks online. 
Soofi along with Simpson watched online jihadist 
videos.92 
Perpetrator Ali Muhammad Brown 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Zale Thompson 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Thompson exhibited the indicator of military service. He 
enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 2001, was deployed in March 
2003, and discharged in August 2003 for misconduct.93 
Online Training 
Indicators 
Thompson exhibited the indicators for watching attacks 
online and visiting extremist sites. He is known to have to 
viewed information about beheadings and terrorist 
organizations.94 
Perpetrator Tamerlan Tsvnaev 
Physical Training Tamerlan exhibited the indicators for overseas travel and 
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Indicators group practice. He traveled to Dagestan, a republic 
within Russia, in 2011 and 2012.9596 Tamerlan also is on 
video visiting a gun range with his brother.97 
Online Training 
Indicators 
Tamerlan exhibited the indicators for manual download, 
watching attacks online, visiting extremist sites and 
private messages with known Jihadists. The Al Qaeda 
Inspire magazine was found on his hard drive, his 
YouTube account contained multiple militant videos, 
other jihadist materials were on his laptop from various 
extremist sites and has been linked at least online to 
William Plotnikov, a Canadian Boxer who was in 
Daegstan fighting with known terrorist forces.98  
Perpetrator Dhzokhar Tsavnaev 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Dhzokhar exhibited the indicator for group practice. 
Video was taken of Dhzokhar and his brother at a gun 
range.99  
Online Training 
Indicators 
Dhzokhar has indicators for manual download, watching 
attacks online, and visiting extremist sites. The material 
found on Tamerlan’s computer was also found on 
Dhzokhar’s as Tamerlan shared all the material with his 
brother.  
Perpetrator Abdulatif Ali Aldosary 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Aldosary exhibited the indicators for military service. He 
fought with anti-government forces in Iraq during the 
1991 attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein.100 
Online Training 
Indicators 
Aldosary exhibited the indicator for manual download. 
Bomb making instructions were found in his residence.101 
Perpetrator Yonathan Melaku 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Melaku exhibited the indicator for military service. He 
served in the Marine Corps and was a Marine Corps 
Reservist at the time of the attack.102 
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Online Training 
Indicators 
Melaku exhibited the indicator for manual download. He 
downloaded manuals for bomb making and 
explosives.103 
Perpetrator Faisal Shahzad 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Shahzad exhibited the indicators for proof of training and 
overseas travel His last listed visit to Pakistan was in 
2010.104 Shahzad has stated that he trained in a Taliban 
training camp in 2009 during his time in Pakistan..105106  
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Abdulmutallab exhibited the indicators for proof of 
training. Al Qaeda released a video of Abdulmutallab 
training with Anwar al-Awlaki in 2009 at one of the 
training camps.107  
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Nidal Malik Hasan 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Hasan exhibited the indicators for military service. He 
was a psychiatrist with the Army at the time of the attack 
and had been serving since 1988.108 109  
Online Training 
Indicators 
Hasan exhibited the indicators for visiting extremist sites 
and private messages with known terror organizations. 
He communicated through email with Anwar al-Awlaki in 
2008.110 Hasan’s computers also showed that he visited 
jihadist websites.111 
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Perpetrator Abdulhakim Muhammad 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Muhammad exhibited the indicator for overseas travel and 
group practice; he traveled to Yemen in 2007.112 
Muhammad purchased weapons and practiced firing at 
empty construction sites.113 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Charles Bishop 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Eid Elwirelwir 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Online Training 
Indicators 
N/A 
Perpetrator Richard Reid 
Physical Training 
Indicators 
Reid exhibited the indicators for proof of training and 
overseas travel. He was also identified by another 
extremist and an instructor at one of the Afghanistan 
camps as having received training in the camps during his 
time overseas between 1999 and 2001.114  
Online Training 
Indicators 
Reid exhibited the indicators for private messages with 
known terror organizations.115 French authorities 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1783237.stm. 
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discovered that Reid was receiving instruction from Al 
Qaeda in Pakistan through email.116  
Physical Indicator Analysis 
The following charts summarize the data by indicators and by perpetrator. 
The physical indicators are skewed towards the weaker indicators.  
 
Table 4. Occurrences of Physical Indicators 
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Abdul Razak Ali Artan 0 0 0 1 
Ahmad Khan Rahami 1 0 0 1 
Omar Mateen 0 0 0 1 
Edward Archer 0 0 0 1 
Syed Rizwan Farook 0 0 1 1 
Tashfeen Malik 0 0 1 1 
Faisal Mohammad 0 0 0 0 
Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez 0 0 1 1 
Elton Simpson 0 0 1 0 
Nadir Soofi 0 0 1 0 
Ali Muhammad Brown 0 0 0 0 
Zale Thompson 0 1 0 0 
Tamerlan Tsavnaev 0 0 1 1 
Dhzokhar Tsavnaev 0 0 1 0 
Abdulatif Ali Aldosary 0 0 1 0 
Yonathan Melaku 0 1 0 0 
Faisal Shahzad 1 0 0 1 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 1 0 0 1 
Nidal Malik Hasan 0 1 0 0 
Abdulhakim Muhammad 0 0 1 1 
Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar 0 0 0 0 
Charles Bishop 0 0 0 0 
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Eid Elwirelwir 0 0 0 0 
Richard Reid 1 0 0 1 
Total 4 4 8 12 
 
Out of the total twenty-four perpetrators there were four who trained in an 
established terrorist training camp. Eight perpetrators participated in a group 
training exercise. While only four perpetrators were enlisted with a United States 
Military branch or fought with an international military unit. Finally, twelve of the 
twenty-four perpetrators traveled overseas for personal reasons. 
Physical Indicator Discussion 
 
Figure 1. Physical Training Indicators by Percent 
 
The weakest indicator, overseas travel, yielded the highest indicator value. 
However, when this is contrasted with the indicator for proof of training in an 
established terrorist training camp it shows how weak of an indicator it really is. 
Only four of the twelve individuals, Ahmad Khan Rahami, Fraisal Shahzad, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab and Richard Reid, who went overseas trained expressed 
21% 
28% 35% 
16% 
Physical Training Indicators by 
Percent 
Training Camp Attendance Group Practice
Military Service Overseas Travel
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the indicator for training within an established terrorist training camp, which gives 
rise to the idea that perhaps while the media loves to speculate about what the 
perpetrators are doing while they are overseas that it is just that, speculation. 
This study provided no indication that personal overseas travel to countries with 
known terrorist training camps indicates that individuals received training in a 
terrorist training camp. The four who traveled overseas to a known terrorist 
training camp did not exhibit any other physical training indicators except 
overseas travel.  
The second most frequent indicator was group practice, with eight of the 
twenty-four perpetrators, Syed Rizwan Farook, Tashfeen Malik, Mohammad 
Youssuf Abdulazeez, Elton Simpson, Nadir Soofi, Tamerlan Tsavnaev, Dhzokhar 
Tsavnaev, and Abdulhakim Muhammad, participating in some type of group 
practice with friends or family. This could mean that when attendance at a 
terrorist training camp is not possible, individuals will seek out alternative 
methods of physical training such as informal group practice. The real 
importance of this indicator rests in the idea that physical training; even in an 
informal environment is still important to those wishing to perpetrate terrorist 
attacks. Interestingly, the four who did have formal training in a terrorist training 
camp did not have the indicator for practice.  
Lastly, only four individuals had prior military service training: Zale 
Thompson, Abdulatif Ali Aldosary, Yonathan Melku and Nidal Malik Hasan. 
Those with military service exhibited some of the same patterns of indicators as 
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those who trained in a physical training camp. None of them practiced outside 
what was required for their military service but they did not travel overseas for 
personal reasons.  
Online Indicator Analysis 
The following charts summarize the data by indicators and by perpetrator. 
The online indicators show a large portion of individuals exhibiting online 
indicators visited extremist websites while only a few actually downloaded 
manuals from the sites.117 
 
Table 5. Occurrences of Online Indicators 
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Abdul Razak Ali Artan 0 0 0 0 
Ahmad Khan Rahami 0 0 1 1 
Omar Mateen 0 0 1 1 
Edward Archer 0 0 0 0 
Syed Rizwan Farook 1 1 0 1 
Tashfeen Malik 0 0 0 1 
Faisal Mohammad 0 0 0 1 
Mohammad Youssuf 
Abdulazeez 
0 0 0 0 
Elton Simpson 1 0 1 0 
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 It is recognized by the author that online indicators in particular may be underreported by the 
media due to law enforcement and other authorities not releasing the entirety of a perpetrator’s 
online activities for various reasons, including the necessity to maintain in place undercover 
monitoring of other terrorists or sympathizers that may have come into contact with a perpetrator 
for prevention of future attacks.  
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Nadir Soofi 0 0 1 0 
Ali Muhammad Brown 0 0 0 0 
Zale Thompson 0 0 1 1 
Tamerlan Tsavnaev 1 1 1 1 
Dhzokhar Tsavnaev 0 1 1 1 
Abdulatif Ali Aldosary 0 1 0 0 
Yonathan Melaku 0 1 0 0 
Faisal Shahzad 0 0 0 0 
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 0 0 0 0 
Nidal Malik Hasan 1 0 0 1 
Abdulhakim Muhammad 0 0 0 0 
Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar 0 0 0 0 
Charles Bishop 0 0 0 0 
Eid Elwirelwir 0 0 0 0 
Richard Reid 0 0 0 0 
Totals 5 5 7 9 
The strongest indicator, private messages with known terrorists was only 
exhibited by four of the total twenty-four perpetrators. Manuals were downloaded 
by five perpetrators, while seven watched attacks online. The highest occurring 
indicator was the weakest, with nine perpetrators visiting extremist sites online.  
Online Indicator Discussion 
 
Figure 2. Online Indicators by Percent 
21% 
27% 36% 
16% 
Online Indicators by Percent 
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Out of the twenty- four perpetrators, only four of them were known to have 
communicated with known terrorists through private messages: Syed Rizwan 
Farook, Elton Simpson, Tamerlan Tsavnaev and Nidal Malik Hasan. It is 
unknown what Farook discussed with his Al Nusra and al-Shabbab contacts118 
and Hasan is said to have exchanged emails about religion with Anwar al-Awlaki 
about119 but it is unknown what Tamerlan discussed with William Plotnikov.120 
Simpson received instruction for the Garland attack through private messages.121  
Overall, it appears that while it is a viable concept for instruction to be received 
directly from terrorist organizations but it may not occur as frequently as 
speculated by the media. However, it is possible that not all connections to 
known terror organizations have been revealed in open source media.  
The second strongest indicator, manual download occurred only five times 
which was marginally lower than anticipated. With the ease of access to the 
internet and the abundance of information to be found on the web it was 
expected that nearly all of the perpetrators would have expressed this indicator 
however, only Syed Rizwan Farook, Tamerlan Tsavnaev and Dhzokhar 
Tsavnaev were in possession of the Al Qaeda Inspire magazine. The other two 
individuals, Abdulatif Ali Aldosary and Yonathan Melaku were in possession of 
unspecified bomb making instructions. However, watching attacks online was the 
                                                 
118
 “San Bernardino terrorist housewife”  
119
 “’I am the shooter.’ 
120
 Candiotti, “Boston bombings suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev sought out a different name.” 
121
 “Attack in Garland,” interview by Anderson Cooper, 60 Minutes, CBS News, August 20,2017, 
Transcript.  
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second most represented indicator with seven total occurrences. The 
consumption of violent videos online appears to be a more recent aspiration for 
those who wish to commit terrorist attacks. 
Lastly, nine of the twenty-four perpetrators visited extremist sites. This 
indicator is unfortunately weak because it is not known what information the 
perpetrators were accessing but it does show an eagerness to seek out and read 
information pertaining to personal interests in terrorism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS 
Physical vs. Online Indicator Discussion 
 
Figure 3. Physical Indicators vs. Online Indicators, by Percent 
 
In total the physical indicators outweigh the online indicators by only 6%. 
Though it is recognized that each specific case must be examined to determine 
what the main source of training is for each individual. One of the main 
hypotheses in recent years is that the internet is removing the need/desire for 
physical training in favor of training that may be safer and easier to access 
online.122 Looking at the data from the twenty-four perpetrators included in this 
study should establish some basis for determining the validity of this idea. 
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 Kirby, “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”. 
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Figure 4. Physical vs. Online Indicators Over Time 
 
There is an obvious gap in the timeline for indicators, between the years of 
post-9/11 2001 and 2008 there were only three cases of jihadist terrorism within 
the United States: Eid Elwirelwir, Preston Lit and Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar. 
Preston Lit was excluded and the other two cases did not express any indicators 
for any category.  
Only in two years, 2013 and 2014, did online indicators surpass physical 
indicators. The case from 2013 is that of the Boston Marathon Bombers, who 
appear to have for the most part used the Inspire magazine which included plans 
for the detonator types the Tsavnaev brothers used in their pressure cooker 
bombs. The two cases in 2014 were Zale Thompson and Ali Muhammad Brown. 
Thompson expressed two online indicators, watching attacks online and visiting 
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extremist websites. His physical indicator was military enlistment. Brown did not 
exhibit indicators for either category. 
The pattern that appears to be emerging starting in 2015 is the 
combination of researching materials online and self-directed practice. There 
were five cases of practice in 2015 alone and all of the cases also had the 
indicators for watching attacks online or visiting extremist websites. It is possible 
that online research is being used to supplement physical training rather than 
replace it entirely. There was a surge of online indicators between the years of 
2013 and 2014 that could have represented a shift in the direction of online 
training replacing physical training; however the trend reversed in 2015. Due to 
the small N size of the study and the fact that some cases from 2016 are not 
represented due to the lack of indicators, it is possible repeat of this study in a 
few years would yield a more complete picture. However, at this time it appears 
that supplementation rather than replacement is what is occurring in relation to 
how terrorists are receiving training.  
Individual examination of indicators for each perpetrator reveals four 
categories that a person can fall into for the main source of training: Physically 
Trained, Online Trained, Self-Directed Online Learning Focus or Hybrid with 
Practice, and No Training/Undetermined.  
41 
 
 
Figure 5. Bar Graph of Total Expressed Indicators by Perpetrator 
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Physically Trained  
There are eight perpetrators, Richard Reid, Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab,Faisal Shahzad, Ahmad Khan Rahami, Nidal Malik Hasan, 
Yonathan Melaku, Abdulatif Ali Aldosary and Zale Thompson, who present with 
physical training as their main source of training. Reid, Abdulmutallab, Shahzad 
and Rahami were all training inside an established terrorist training camp.  
Hasan, Melaku, and Thompson all served with a branch of the United States 
Military and Aldosary fought with anti-government forces overseas. Both groups 
exhibited many of the same patterns of indicators, physical training with no or 
very little online activity.  The following charts summarize the pattern of how the 
indicators occur together. 
 
Table 6. Correlation Chart of Proof of Training in an Established Training Camp 
to     Other Indicators 
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Of the four perpetrators who trained in an established terrorist training 
camp only Rahami spent a great deal of time watching online attacks, going on 
extremist websites and listening to Jihadist lectures according to his father. 123 
This suggests that the instruction received at the training camps is superior to 
any information that would be found online, in Rahami’s case it appears that his 
internet activity is linked more closely to radicalization rather than training.  
 
Table 7. Correlation Chart of Military Service to Other Indicators 
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For those with military service, it was found that they did not practice or go 
overseas for personal reasons but they did spend slightly more time online. 
Melaku and Aldosary downloaded manuals, while Hasan visited extremist sites 
and communicated with known terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki. Thompson visited sites 
and watched attacks online. This group, while they had enough physical training 
that they did not feel the need to practice, still sought out more information about 
conducting attacks. This could be because the physical skills gained through 
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 Santora, “’Keep an eye on him.’” 
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military service are not entirely adequate in comparison to the training received in 
established terrorist training camps for conducting terrorist attacks.  
Online Trained 
Tamerlan and Dhzokhar Tsavnaev represent the only two perpetrators 
that clearly received most of their instruction from the Internet. Dhzokhar testified 
that they built the bombs based on the Al Qaeda Inspire magazine. It was 
debated that Tamerlan may have had contact with Chechen rebels during his 
time in Russia, but a direct link to a terrorist training camp was never established. 
Additionally, the brothers visited a gun range to practice their shooting, but guns 
were not the main weapon of choice for their attack. As practice is not commonly 
associated with explosives creation as there is no good way to practice124 this in 
the United States without detection, the gun range practice is considered 
secondary to the download of explosive manuals.  
Self-Directed Online Learning Focus or Hybrid With Practice 
Seven of the perpetrators, Omar Mateen, Nadir Soofi, Elton Simpson, 
Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez, Tashfeen Malik, Syed Rizwan Farook, and 
Abdulhakim Muhammad, showed signs of looking online for instructions or 
inspiration and then combining this with practice in an attempt to learn the skills 
necessary for their attack.  
 
                                                 
124
 It is recognized that it is possible to practice constructing the explosives, but to test if they 
actually work is difficult to do without detection. Therefore, they would have had no way to test 
their devices to determine what improvements would need to be made to their technique.  
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Table 8. Correlation Chart of Group Practice to Other Indicators 
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None of the perpetrators in this group visited a terrorist training camp or 
had military service but they exhibited a wide variety cyber and physical 
indicators.  Both Soofi and Simpson practiced with the firearms they used in the 
attack, but did not have much online activity, though they were directed by known 
terrorist over the internet.  Abdulazeez used a gun for his attacks and was known 
to have practiced shooting with various instruments, including BB and Paintball 
guns, while growing up. It does not appear he ever took any formal shooting 
classes, and no links to terror camps were established for his trip to Jordan. 
However, Abdulazeez did not have any online indicators making him almost 
entirely self-directed practice focused. Malik and Farook both went to firing 
ranges to practice and while they had explosives for their attack they did not 
detonate. Farook’s longtime friend admitted the two looked at Inspire and it is not 
thought that Farook or Malik attended a training camp while traveling abroad. It 
appears the two participated in practice and self-directed online learning. Finally, 
Abdulhakim Muhammad purchased weapons and practiced firing with them. 
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While he traveled overseas there were never links that officially tied him to a 
training camp and it appears that he participated in self-directed learning.  
No Training/Undetermined 
There were several cases where there were no strong indicators to 
support what type of training the perpetrator might have had or they appeared to 
not have any training at all. The cases of Abdul Razak Ali Artan, Edward Archer, 
Faisal Mohammad, Ali Muhammad Brown, Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, 
Charles Bishop and Eid Elwirelwir all present this dilemma.  
Abdul Razak Ali Artan spent a large part of his childhood in Pakistan after 
fleeing Somalia due to terrorist persecution, it does not appear that he was 
trained formally by terrorists but it is unknown how close of contact he had with 
the terror groups. His father was reportedly kidnapped by them leaving the 
question on if the family had been involved with one of the organizations.125   
Edward Archer has not had many details released about his online 
activity, even though he did spend time overseas his attack consisted of firing a 
stolen gun at a police car. Out of thirteen shots Archer fired only three of them hit 
the officer126 and this was after Archer reached through the window, it does not 
appear that Archer had much, if any, firearms training.  
Faisal Mohammad spent time on extremist sites and while he had a 
detailed plan about how he was going to carry out his attack, Mohammad was 
                                                 
125
 Zapotosky, “Ohio State attacker.” 
126
 Amanda Holpuch, “Police investigate Philadelphia shooting suspect’s computers and finances; 
Edward Archer, 33, visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt, says FBI Investigators downplay suggested 
Isis link to attack on officer,” Guardian, January 9, 2016.  
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thwarted when he had a chair thrown at him. Instead of adapting to the new 
situation or showing any level of skill in self-defense and hand to hand combat he 
fled. It is unlikely that Mohammad had any sort of physical or online training.   
Ali Muhammad Brown murdered three individuals with a firearm, but there 
was no statements made about his online habits or if he spent time at firing 
ranges practicing.  
Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar drove an SUV into a crowd but did not kill 
anyone and then turned himself in. Very little has been released about his 
background or online habits.  
Charles Bishop flew a small plane into a building, leaving a suicide note 
that expressed support for Osama Bin Laden. Bishop was learning to fly at the 
airfield where he stole the plane from. Nothing was released about his internet 
habits or if he had spent any time out of the country.  
Lastly, Eid Elwirelwir drove a car through the security gate at March 
Airforce Base but no connection could be made to official terrorist organizations 
and his online habits were not divulged in open source media.  
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Training Trends 
 
Figure 6. Perpetrators by Training Category 
 
The largest group is physically trained with Self-Directed Learning or 
Hybrid with Practice following closely behind, though it should be noted that out 
of those physically trained only four of them received training at an established 
terrorist training camp. This suggests that while it is becoming rarer to train at an 
actual established terrorist training camp, that some form of physical training 
remains important to terrorist perpetrators. The No Training/Undetermined 
category is the same as the Self-Directed Online Learning or Hybrid with Practice 
category, some of this is unfortunately due to a lack of information on 
perpetrators. In the future it may be possible to reevaluate the background of 
selected perpetrators to see if any new information has been released that could 
determine how they trained.  
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Implications 
Why Physical Training Will Always be Relevant 
Benson has previously drawn attention to the fact that information online is 
not necessarily understandable enough to be made actionable by most 
individuals.127 What is lacking from the current discussion is an examination as 
to why physical training remains relevant. Exploration of how the human mind 
learns and encodes information is necessary to understand this phenomenon. 
Perceptual learning theory in relation to the acquisition of motor skills, explains 
why the self-guided learning through use of the internet will never be capable of 
fully replacing physical training camps.  
Perceptual learning theory as applied to motor skill acquisition states that 
new skills are acquired through environmental demand and adapt over time to be 
executed effortlessly.128 To successfully execute the skill, “…depends on the 
ability to adapt and respond to opportunities and threats in the immediate 
environment.”129 If an individual has only shot a specific firearm in a controlled 
environment, in a straight line without moving then that is what their brain knows 
how to do. The individual possesses the shallow knowledge of how to execute a 
task in one manner to achieve the required result. Their brain knows how to look 
down the sight of that particular weapon at a specific target. This is a much 
different situation than would likely be encountered by the individual during an 
                                                 
127
 Benson, “Why the Internet is Note Increasing Terrorism,” 299. 
128
 Rosalie, “A Model for the Transfer of Perceptual-Motor Skill Learning in Human Behaviors,” 
413. 
129
 Ibid, 416 
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attack. Targets will likely be moving and interacting with the environment around 
them. For example, Faisal Mohammad who attacked the University of California, 
Merced college campus, carried a very detailed plan in his pocket of how he was 
going to execute his attack. He planned to stab students, take hostages and 
grease the floor with petroleum jelly so that responding police officers would slip 
and fall, allowing Mohammad to take their guns to continue his attack.130 
Mohammad found his attack cut short after only stabbing four victims because a 
construction worker interrupted him by throwing a chair at him.131 Though he 
stabbed the construction worker, Mohammad fled the scene and failed to carry 
out the rest of his planned attack. What appeared viable on paper was not 
possible to execute in a dynamic environment without proper training. 
Mohammad lacked the in-depth training that would have allowed for him to 
understand the different situations that he might need to respond to during his 
attack. Essentially, he had no contingency plan for if the attack did not go exactly 
how he had planned it on paper, highlighting that physical training is required 
beyond self-directed E-learning to establish deep learning.  
An experiment that supports the theory that some physical training is 
required to establish deep learning was conducted by Itai Noick and Eilon Vaadi. 
Participants of the experiment were required to clasp a robotic arm handle while 
seated at a workstation, while a cursor and target stimuli were projected onto a 
mirror in front of them. They then had to move a cursor controlled by the robotic 
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 Levin, “Attack on California university campus was Isis-inspired.” 
131
 Giwargis, “UC Merced: Manifesto detailed Faisal Mohammad’s revenge plot.” 
51 
 
arm into the target zone without being able to see the robotic arm or their 
hand.132 The experiment required participates to learn how to hit a target and 
then were presented with a secondary target that used a similar hand motion to 
hit. The study discovered several things; it appears that participants were using 
an adaptive learning technique to hit the test target after the learned target rather 
than just learning the hand motion. Additionally, participants often made more 
initial errors when presented with test targets and not learned targets possibly 
due to participants attempting to calculate the required hand motion to the test 
target based on the learned target.  Participants were inferring the learned hand 
motion to adapt to the new situation. Lastly, it took participants roughly 20 trials 
to learn to hit a new target.133    
These experiments help to establish a balance between the 10,000 hours 
required for expert level performance mentioned above, and no practice at all. It 
appears that physical practice in multiple situations is required to learn a motor 
skill. As demonstrated in the Novick and Vaadi experiments, learning a motor-
skill in a particular manner can interfere with an individual’s ability to adapt it to a 
new situation. The internet, with as much information as it can provide even 
using a variety of platforms, without instructor input or sufficient guided practice 
with instructor assessment the material cannot be interactive enough for self-
directed learners to master technical skills. Individuals can learn a theory online, 
                                                 
132
 Itai Novick and Eilon Vaadia, “Just Do it: Action-Dependent Learning Allows Sensory 
Prediction,” PLoS One 6, no. 10, (October 2011):1 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0026020.  
133
 Ibid, 5. 
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but they do not necessarily know how to put it into practice. Training camps and 
informal small group instruction with a qualified instructor, offers the proper 
environment to learn a new motor skill and therefore physical training retains its 
relevance to terrorist training even with hybridization with online material.  
Areas of Future Research 
Since the United States provided such a small N number for the study, it 
would be interesting to repeat the study on perpetrators within different countries 
to see if the conclusion remains the same; physical training is still relevant but is 
being supplemented with online materials when qualified instructors are scarce 
or travel is difficult. By performing the study on several different countries and 
then bringing all the data together for analysis it may be possible to determine if 
there is indeed a new pattern emerging for terrorism without having to wait 
several years for more data to become available within the United States. 
Additionally, it is possible to compare the attacks within this study now that the 
main source of training has been determined for each perpetrator to determine a 
rate of effectiveness for online vs. physical training, do perpetrators with online or 
physical training cause more casualties and injuries with their attacks. 
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Conclusion 
At this time, it does not appear that terrorists within the United States are 
moving away from physical training in favor of online training. Instead, a pattern 
of self-directed online and physical hybrid training appears to be emerging; 
physical training is still an important factor to terrorist training, but is now being 
supplemented with self-directed online learning and group practice instead of 
attendance at an established terrorist training camp. Perceptual learning theory 
as applied to motor skill acquisition provides a suggestion as to why physical 
training remains important to terrorists. Muscle memory is vital to being able to 
perform a physical skill under a myriad of situations and muscle memory cannot 
be established from online training or distance education alone. A physical 
component, such as practice remains necessary.  
It was also found that physical training in an established terrorist training 
camp likely provided superior instruction for those who were able to attend in 
comparison to those who received physical training from another source such as 
military enlistment. Those who attended an established terrorist training camp, 
for the most part, did not go online for additional information or practice 
suggesting that they were able to absorb enough of the information at the camps 
to develop some level of muscle memory that made it unnecessary to practice 
before their attack once they returned to the United States. While those with 
military enlistment also did not practice, they were slightly more likely to search 
online for terrorist material online.  
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This thesis has also demonstrated that the argument of the existence of 
an online training camp is important, what the argument really does is highlight 
the need for better definitions of what constitutes an online terrorist training camp 
and physical training camp within the field of terrorism studies. Through 
operationalizing the concepts of physical terrorist training camps and online 
training camp to better analyze the actual type of training terrorist perpetrators 
are engaging in the argument becomes slightly more focused and relevant. It is 
the hope of the author that the definitions provided in the methodology section 
can be used as a springboard to help define some of the abstract concepts 
involved in the argument. 
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APPENDIX A 
CORRELATION CHARTS OF INDICATORS 
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